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MULTIPLE USE DECISION MAKING-WHERE
DO WE GO FROM HERE?*
R. S. WHALEYt

Considerable attention is being focused on the problems of making
multiple use resource allocation decisions about public lands. Private
businesses from the corner grocery to General Motors seem to allocate their capital resources without encountering any particular
conceptual problems. The criteria for making investment decisions
such as pay-out-period, rate of return on investment, or present net
worth are appropriately used. However, these tools of private business are deemed inadequate for making resource allocation decisions
about federal lands.
UNIQUENESS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION ON PUBLIC LANDS

Problems of allocating resources on public forest lands are of special interest because of two characteristics peculiar to multiple use
decisions: (1) their "publicness" and (2) the lack of data for traditional investment analyses.
First let us examine-the problems associated with "publicness." A
central concept of economics in the capitalistic world is that the
price system, operating through the market place, balances supply
and demand, efficiently allocating scarce resources among competing
uses. The market system, however, does not result in an optimum
allocation of resources in all instances.' We, as a body politic, have
decided that many natural resources are exceptions and have removed some decisions regarding these resources from the traditional
market system putting them under public control.
Such decisions need not be arbitrary. There are criteria that may
be used to judge the legitimate "publicness" of any resource allocation decision. These criteria arise from the failure of the market
system to efficiently allocate resources.2
* This article is an outgrowth of a seminar sponsored by the U.S. Forest Service in
Portland, Oregon on April 22, 1968. It is an attempt to formalize a statement made by the
author at that seminar. At this stage it is difficult to claim originality because the contents
have obviously been influenced by the other participants. Also, the author has benefited
from the review and comments offered by N.K. Roberts and Darwin Nielsen, both with the
Department of Agricultural Economics, Utah State University.
t Professor and Head, Department of Forest Science, Utah State University.
1. The kinds of decisions that are most efficiently handled by either the market system,
the political system, or some central agency are not easily delineated. This issue represents a
major difference between capitalism, socialism, and Marxism.
2. For a detailed discussion of the appropriate role of the public sector the reader should
see Problems of the Modern Economy (E. Phelps ed. 1962); particularly W. Heller, Reflections on Public Expenditure Theory, 124.
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The first criterion occurs in conjunction with substantial third
party benefits. That is, some goods and services such as education,
defense, mental hospitals, etc., offer benefits beyond those that
accrue to the direct recipient of the service. The market system,
which expresses only the demand of the direct beneficiaries, tends to
under-estimate the values received from such services.
The second criterion arises from the fact that some commodities
are associated with indirect social costs. Choice examples are water
and air pollution. If these social costs are not or cannot be absorbed
by the producer of the commodity or its consumer, they may have
no influence on the price of the commodity, and they then would
not be weighed by the market system.
A third criterion for public intervention occurs with technical
monoplies.3 Postal service, telephone service, and transportation are
classified by some economists as technological monopolies, where
government may have to subsidize production of the commodity to
insure a supply at a price that meets the demands of society.
A fourth criterion arises from substantial differences between the
time preference of society as a whole and an individual's time preferences. It rests largely on the greater ability of government to absorb
uncertainty in investments in such things as basic research.
Elements of several of the above considerations are relevant to the
supply of multiple products from the nation's forest lands. For
example, the conservation issue involves the consumption of limited
resources over time. It is argued that the time preference of individuals is too limited to weigh adequately the intertemporal value of
resources, the use of which straddles several generations. It can also
be argued that substantial third party benefits result from the production of water and recreation on forest lands.
This article, however, argues neither for nor against government
ownership of vast acreages of forest land. Rather, its purpose is to
point out the resource allocation problems that result from public
ownership. Regardless of which criteria best justify a public supply
of forest-oriented goods and services, the conclusion for investment
purposes is the same. Many of the commodities do not command a
well established market demand. No market-established prices can
represent the values of recreation and water in investment analyses.
Despite the established markets for timber and forage in many parts
of the country, there has been little study of how closely administered prices of forage approximate market values, nor of how federal timber sale appraisal procedures affect the market price of timber from either federal lands or competing private lands. Thus, the
3. See Milton Friedman The Role of Government in a Free Society.
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major problem for multiple-use decision makers relative to public
lands is the lack of data that are needed if the benefits from the
production of certain commodities or combinations of commodities
are to be evaluated. For some products we have no measures of
market value. Whenever demand for goods and services from public
resources is totally, or even partially, free to reflect consumers' desires, any mispricing is quite apparent. If overpricing exists, disuse of
the resource develops; with underpricing, "overuse" may emerge.
This process, however, offers a decidedly imperfect substitute for
market values. Nevertheless, some possible approaches to natural resource allocation or investment decisions can be proposed.
•II
DECISION MAKING TECHNIQUES
The most common approach to the dilemma of making decisions
without value information is to avoid the problem-that is, use a
method that does not require value data. Two forms of this approach
are:
1) Establish physical production goals at least cost.
2) Maximize physical output for a predetermined level of expenditure.4
Hundreds of illustrations of these two procedures have occurred in
"public forestry" during the past several decades. The forester, for
example, may have had a specific budget item for tree planting and
within the limits of his budget he tried to plant as many acres as
possible. As a result, the least promising acres were often planted
first, because areas such as the poorly producing mid-western sand
flats offer inexpensive planting opportunities. Thus, criteria that do
not require value data may result in improper investment priorities
from any kind of benefit-cost standpoint.
There have been some interesting recent applications of investment criteria that make only limited use of product values. U.S.
Forest Service researchers attempted to develop planning models for
multiple use management and devised the imaginative Resource Allocation Models. These models have been successfully used with linear
programming techniques to determine least-cost solutions for prescribed multiple use goals. The computerized linear program solutions have allowed consideration of extremely complex problems
involving many different kinds of costs and physical outputs.
Though these Resource Allocation Models presently offer the best
solution to multiproduct output decisions on Forest Service lands,
4. H. Webster and P. Haggenstein, Economic Analysis of Watershed Management Decisions- What Sort of Guide for Land Managers?, 61 J. Forestry 631 (1963).
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they do not incorporate the important policy issues involved in setting appropriate production goals. Solutions to these models depend
upon first setting the physical production goals. That is, water production, timber cut, or animal unit goals must be determined as
inputs into the model. The land manager must determine the
optimum output from his lands. Thus, even the newest refinements
in using cost minimization criteria for solving multiple use decisions
do little to guarantee an optimum solution based on measures of
public welfare.
Still another way to avoid the value problem-which unfortunately
has been used too often-is to claim that no economically rational
solution exists. Some would advocate that an uninformed decision in
the political arena somehow is superior to other decision making
techniques. In truth, however, the best political solution can only be
achieved with information regarding benefits and costs.
A second possibility for solving public investment or allocation
decisions is what can be called the macroeconomic approach. If a
major role of public resource utilization is economic development in
its broadest sense, then the techniques of simply minimizing costs or
maximizing differences between benefits and costs may not be appropriate to investment decisions on public lands. As Kenneth
Boulding states, "the great hiatus in economics

. . .

is a real link be-

tween price theory of any kind and a theory of economic development."' If the goal of public resource use is economic development,
why not deal with the problem more directly and look at the impacts
of certain allocation decisions on such variables as regional or national income, regional or national employment and economic
stability?
The stated goals of public land management have not explicity
included economic development as a central issue. However, it is
implicitly included in justifying certain programs-for example,
stabilizing the livestock industry or protecting a certain locality's
lumber industry. Thus, employment and local or regional income
considerations do seem to influence public land allocation decisions.
Little or no research has been done concerning the regional or
national economic impacts of alternative forest land uses. Only recently has some study been directed toward measuring and predicting the impacts of dams and other water developments on surrounding communities. One thing apparent from these few studies is the
extreme difficulty of accurately measuring the regional impacts from
even multimillion dollar projects.
5. K. Boulding, The Uses of Price Theory, in Models of Markets 371 (A. Oxenfeldt ed.
1963).
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The size of the region over which impacts are expected has considerable influence on our ability to identify changes due to specific
investments. If the relevant region is large, for example a state, one
might logically conclude that most measures of macroeconomic variables lack sufficient sensitivity to assess changes resulting from the
relatively small investments that characterize forest lands or from
shifts in land use patterns. If, however, we are interested in measuring impacts on smaller units, such as communities, the techniques
available, which include input-output analysis or economic base
analysis, do not seem particularly appropriate for measuring the economic interrelationships that exist within small rural areas. The
strong economic dependence of the region under study on distant
urban centers tends to cloud the intraregional economic picture.
The macroeconomic (or regional analysis) models for making multiple use decisions seem to have three major shortcomings. First, they
are not sufficiently sensitive to measure changes associated with
small investments. Second, they do not come to grips with the major
policy issue of how much should be invested in the various kinds of
development that are possible on public forest lands. At best, we can
set criteria that require maximizing the level of employment for a
given budget or obtaining a given level of employment at a minimum
cost. These suboptimization techniques do not solve the problem of
how much money should be invested in various development or use
combinations on public lands.
Third, in dealing with aggregate figures for income or employment, the problems of income distribution are often ignored. An
apparent increase in regional income may equate with decreased income and employment in other regions. Changes in land use patterns
may generate interregional flows of income or they may change the
relative contributions of the public and private sectors in supplying
resources.
Considering the above shortcomings, most economists would agree
that the best approach toward ranking alternative land uses would
require some attempt to evaluate the difference or ratios between
benefits and costs. If evaluation of benefits in relationship to costs is
the appropriate criterion, then many analytical models come to the
foreground. Benefit-cost ratios, internal rates of return, and joint
production models equating marginal rates of substitution between
goods, are all methods that can be used to compare benefits and
costs of various investment schemes.
Though the mechanics of performing these kinds of analysis are
relatively simple, they have been little used in analyzing public investments. The attempts by the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

Reclamation to apply these methods could at best be called incomplete, unsatisfactory efforts to compare benefits and costs. The dissatisfaction associated with this use stems from the difficulty of
assigning a quantitative measure to benefits derived from non-market
supplied goods and services. In many instances two of the most
important products of water development (and likewise from forest
development) are recreation and water for domestic use. Yet neither
of these products has an established market value which can be
plugged into investment analyses. Methods that approach multiple
use decisions from a profit maximizing standpoint have therefore
been little used because of the lack of value figures for many of the
benefits. This lack has promoted considerable recent research on the
problem of resource values. Most of this has dealt with problems of
recreation valuation.
Ill

STATUS OF RESOURCE VALUATION
Before examining the status of resource valuation, it is important
to clarify precisely what kind of value we are seeking. Many of the
critics of current research in resource valuation are not fully aware of
the problems of setting a value on a particular resource use. Those
critics seem to assume that every good or service has an inherent
value peculiar to it and that the researcher must find this single value
for each resource use. This concept of a single inherent value for each
commodity is false, since every good and service has several values.
Each has a value in exchange, that being the number of goods
that can be obtained by means of giving up or exchanging one unit of
the commodity is question. Each good or service also has a unique
value for each individual consumer. This is the amount that the
individual's psychic welfare is improved through owning or consuming the particular commodity. A good has a third value that equates
with its cost of production.
The fallacy is therefore obvious in an assumption that a particular
resource has only one unique value and that the researcher has but to
gaze into a crystal ball to find this heretofore hidden number.
Rather, determining a value for a particular type of recreation or for
the domestic consumption of water is a problem solved by arriving at
an index number (expressed in dollars) that approximates one of the
above measures of value. Therefore, the many values of a particular
resource may each have a possible application in some resource allocation model. The only valid grounds for criticizing a particular proxy
value determined through research are: (1) that it is an index of a
value not applicable to a particular allocation model; or (2) that
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through a flaw in concept or methodology, the index is not an accurate approximation of the value being estimated. Many researchers
can and should be criticized, however, for not explicitly stating just
what kind of value they are trying to approximate. Without this
definition, it is impossible to evalute the prospective usefulness or
accuracy of their estimates.
Most of the research currently directed at valuing non-market supplied resources has been devoted to putting a dollar value on recreation. To date several general kinds of approaches have been applied
to the problem. These have included: 6
Expenditure Method-measures the value of recreation in terms of
the total expenditures on recreation.
Gross National Product Method-attempts to measure the contribution of recreation to GNP.
Consumers' Surplus Method-attempts to determine the willingness
of individuals to pay for various quantities of recreation. Instrumental in this method is developing a hypothetical demand
curve for recreation.
Cost Method-uses the cost of supplying recreational facilities as a
measure of the benefits derived therefrom.
Monopoly Revenue Method-uses the estimated revenue that would
be obtained by a monopolist owning the recreational site as a
measure of benefits.
Market Value Method-uses fees charged at private resorts as a proxy
value for the value of public-supplied facilities.
Apparently, there is no dearth of ways to evaluate recreation.
These methods or modifications of them can be used in valuing other
resource uses. Yet, there has only been limited success when the
calculated values are inserted in resource allocation models. Although
we have made inroads at developing individual resource values, we
have yet to develop value systems which allow analysis of complex
combinations of resources and resource uses. Even though each of
the above valuation schemes has its appropriate use in isolated circumstances, their application in resource allocation models must be
evaluated on the basis of (1) their appropriateness for measuring
benefits in terms of the optimization criteria of the allocation model;
(2) the comparability of all measures of value in the allocation model
(It is impossible to approach an optimum solution if cattle, timber,
recreation, and water are all measured by different indices of value);
and, (3) whether the value scheme is empirically quantifiable.
6. For a more complete description of the various methods mentioned see L. Lerner,
Quantative Indices of Recreational Values, in Committee on the Economics of Water Resources Development, Western Agricultural Economics Research Council, Report Number
II, Economics in Outdoor Recreational Policy (1962).
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CONCLUSION
An orderly approach to multiple use decision-making requires a
reorientation of research toward a broader approach to the development of resource allocation and investment models. The several kinds
of values we have noted imply a need for equally as many kinds of
allocation models, each using a different value criterion and aimed
toward a different kind of policy goal. The current problem in
multiple use analysis is that we use only one or two allocation or
investment models and restrict ourselves to one valuation system. We
start with a valuation system based on exchange or market values of
a few goods and services and then attempt to force all goods and
services into a like mold. When some uses have not fit this mold,
many resource managers have thrown their hands into the air and
claimed that it is obviously not an economic problem.
At this juncture it is important to know just what economics and
the economist have to contribute to multiple use decision making
and conversely, what are the limits of economics. It is presumptuous
to assume that economics and economists should or can make allocation decisions on public forest lands. These decisions most often
include non-economic goals and require inputs in addition to economic data. To assume otherwise would be to ignore the complex
ecological and hydrological interrelationships that influence land
management. However, achieving even non-economic goals generally
costs society money directly or indirectly in the form of alternative
opportunities foregone. Economists therefore have a contribution to
make in supplying data inputs to improve the knowledge base on
which these decisions are made.
More directly, the economist can perform at least three services to
the decision-maker. The tools of economics (1) can tell how best to
use a resource to maximize an economic goal; (2) can identify the
costs of sacrificing an economic goal to achieve a non-economic one;
and (3) are useful in organizing a procedure that will minimize the
economic costs of achieving a complex goal. The appropriate role of
economics in multiple use decisions therefore depends upon the particular goals of public resource management.
Our current orientation to solving multiple use problems seems to
have the proverbial "cart before the horse." We are concentrating on
the quantification of values without a clear-cut definition of how
derived values will be used. A more logical approach involves three
steps, the order of which is critical. Step one must be a realistic and
explicit statement of goals for the development and use of the public
resource in question. Are these resources to be managed on the basis
of some efficiency criterion, regional growth and stability criterion,
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national growth criterion, physical output criterion (i.e. a conservation goal expressed in terms of physical output per unit of time) or
societal welfare criterion to be evaluated in the voting booth? With
an explicit statement of resource management goals, the second step
is to develop a valuation system which produces a set of indicies
related to the measurement of benefits. This value system should
recognize the three criteria previously mentioned as means of evaluating value systems. The third step is, of course, the application of the
allocation model and its associated value system to multiple use
decision-making.

